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11
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION'S CONSITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT

Jacob Ziemann

Like many regional or global schem es of gove rnance, the European Union has been
criticized as lacking legitimacy because it appears less deliberative, democratic, and
participatory than natio nal governments (Nagel, 2005, Rabkin, 2005, Dahl, 20(6). This
broad criticism applied to the EU is often characterized as a "democratic defi cit". The
possible existence of a democratic deficit in the EU has been a g rowing concern of
politicians, academics, and citizens since the process of European integration began . For
example, remedying the democratic defi cit is regularly cited as one of th e main reasons for
creating and ratifying the Constitutional Treaty. It is no t surprising then that before and after
the recent defeats of the European constitutional proj ect, with referendum 'no' votes in
France and Holland, debate on the democratic deficit has b een lively. T his paper attempts to
make sense of the debate abo ut the existence of the democratic deficit in the EU and to
detail som e of the policy proposals for constitutional reform that are a product of the debate.
I will show tha t the democratic deficit debate has generated compelling proposals about the
direction that future constitutional developments in the EU should take.
Since tllis paper amounts to a survey of the current state of the democratic defi cit
debate every effort will be made to select the most compelling recent arguments in the
debate. Drawing on the literature generated in this debate, the first section of this paper
articulates a central case for the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU. I will refer to
this argument as the democratic deficit thesis . The next section examines the arguments of
the opponents of the democratic defi cit thesis. The third section attempts to identify the
remaining real points of contention between the two sides of trus debate. T he final section
of the paper surveys some of the sets of policy proposals fo r refornling the European Union
that are a product of the ongoing democratic deficit debate.
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT THESIS

A single definitio n for the democratic deficit doesn't exist. The definiti o n va ries
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immensely depending on the nationalities and intellectual positions of the conilllentators
writing on European constitutio nal reform . The first systematic attempt to develop a
'standard case' of the democratic deficit came from Joseph Weiler and his coauthors (Weiler
et. aI., 1995). Tlus 'standard case' was m eant to be a set consisting of broadly used arguments
by politicians, academics, and citizens. However, in recent debate this 'standard case' has been
upgraded with the case o utlined below consisting of five arguments for the existence of the
democratic deficit, based on an analysis first compiled by Andreas Follesdal and SirHon Hix
(2006,534).
First, the creatio n of the EU by the M aastricht Treaty and earlier agreements
adva ncing European integration have resulted in a general increase in executive power and
a general decrease in national govermllents' control over the lawmaking process (Andersen
& Burns, 1996). We will call this argument the 'strong national executives' argument. T he
E uropean Union's institutional design is such that policy-making at the EU level is
donunated by executive actors . Executive actors take the form of national nunisters in the
E uropean Council and national gove rnment appointees in the Commission. This contrasts
with the structure of European national governments, where the government is usually
accountable to voters thro ugh the actions of a parliament. The parliament holds the
executive accountable by criticizing the behavior of the rninisters that make up the
government and can , in extreme situations, remove the government from power. Having
policy-making in EU do nunated by executive actors is not in itself a fault but it is
problematic when the actio ns of the executive actors cannot be controlled by national
parliaments. Executive acto rs at the E U level are simply more isolated from n atio nal
parliamentary scrutiny and control 'than government nunisters at the national level. Because
of the way policy making in the EU is structured it is easier for executive actors to ign ore
the wishes of their national parliaments which has led to an increase in executive power at
the expense of national parliam ents.
This first problem, in theory, should be partially rem edied by the existence of the
E uropea n Parliament. Yet, the second argument advances that the European Parliam ent is
too weak to rein in executive actors in the EU. We will refer to tlus argument as the 'weak
European Parliament' argument. After Maastricht it became clear that national parliaments
were losing power relative to executive institutio ns. In response som e scholars like Lodge
argued that the power of the European Parliament must increase relative to the Council and
the Comnussion (1994). While it is true that the European Parliament has b ecom e
progressively more powelful through successive refo rms it is still possible to c1ailll that it is
weak compared to the executive acto rs in the Council. For example, the governments in the
Council still get to set the legislative agenda by appointing the Comnussion.Also, w hile the
European Parliament can veto the national governments' cho ice for Commission president
and commissioners we can't really argue that the European Parliament elects these officials.
When it comes to spending, the European Parliament can only anlend lines that the
governments in the Council have labeled 'non-compulsory' spending. Finally, even the
procedure of co-decision, which officially provides equ al power of legislation between the
Council and the Parliam ent, does not actually allow the Parliament that much real power in
legislating. This is the case because the majo rity of legislatio n is still passed under the
consultation procedure w hich does not allow the Parliament full veto power (Follesdal &
Hix, 2006, 535). Despite years of reforms to strengthen the E uropean Parliament, arguably
the most participatory institution in the EU and the o nl y directly elected body, it is still

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/13

Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

143

simply too weak relative to the Commission and Council.
T he third argument in the democratic deficit thesis we will call the 'accountability'
argument since it deals w ith the lack of democratic acco untability found in the E uropean
Unio n . Setting aside the elections for th e E uropean Parliament, there are no direct E uropean
electi o ns. C itizens in the EU in ste~ld elect their national governments w ho then sit in the
Council and nominate commissioners. Yet, even the election of the European Parliament
does no t produce democratic acco untability because these elections are not about the
direction of the EU policy agenda or the politicians and parties opera ting at the E uropean
level (Hix, 1999, 103). E uropean Parliam ent electio ns are m ostly abo ut domestic issues not
about EU policy's directio n . Natio nal elections are also o nl y fou ght o n domestic issues not
European issues. Since there is not a European elem ent in national and E uropean Parliament
elections citizens are unable to effectively influ ence the policy agenda of the EU by
expressing their preferences .The nature of current electio ns in the Euro pean Parliament and
the second-order accountability of the Conunission and Council both lead to a situation
w here the officials operating in E U institutions are o nly marginally accountable to citizens.
T he fourth argument we will call the 'distance' argument and it revolves around E U
institutio ns being too distant or removed from voting citizens.We have already discllssed that
electoral control over the Council and the ConU11ission is too far rem oved but there is a
more basic sense in which the EU is distant from its citizens. The institutio ns of the EU are
very difl:e rent from natio nal democratic institutio ns, and therefore, citizens have difficul ty
understancling the EU . Since they have difficulty understanding the E U they are unable to
examine the EU and decide whether it is dem ocra ti c or not. There are a number of
examples of how E U institutions are radically different from dom estic institutions, and
therefore, more difficult to understand.Take the Council , which conducts legislative business
in secret but executive business in the public sphere. The Commissio n is not elected but
appointed through a complex procedure. The policy creation process in the Council , the
Commission, and the Parliament is also fundamentally technocratic rather than political
(Wallace & Smith, 1995, 138). From the perspective of an EU citizen, the European Unio n's
institutio ns are highl y foreign and complex which creates a situation w here participatio n ,
deliberatio n , and expression of preferences by a citizen are challenging.
The final argument, which we will call the 'drift' argument, posits that the EU adopts
policies which d rift away from citizens' real policy preferences. It also argues that the EU
ends up adopting policies that are no t supported by a majority of voters or even a maj ority
of m ember states. This happens because of the four arguments listed above but it also occurs
because govenU11ents are able to pass policies at the European level that they could not find
domestic support fo r. This critique is m ost notabl y developed by social democratic theorists,
like Scharpf, who argue that the policy o utcomes of the EU decisio n making process are
usually right of domestic policy status quos (1999). H e supports tlus argument by claiming
that at the domestic level governments are constrained by courts, parliam ents, and interest
gro ups but at the European level many of these constraints are absent, poorly organized, or
less powerful (1999). T he final part of the 'drift argument' argues that EU policy tends to be
m ore skewed towards the interests of the owners of capital since businesses find it easier to
coordinate their lobbying efforts at the European level since their interests are m o re
concentrated. This compares to trade unions and consumer groups which have more diffuse
interests that are m o re difficult to org;lIuze at the European level for effective lobbying. It is
worth no ting that the 'drift argument' is the only compo nent of the democratic deficit thesis
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which is supported by pointing to evidence of flawed policy outcomes instead of a flawed
policy creation process.
RESPONSE TO THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT THESIS

There are a wide variety of responses to the democratic deficit thesis arguments
presented above. Giandomenico Majo ne was the first scholar to systematically attack certain
argmnents of the democratic deficit thesis and claim that the EU was not in a state of
democratic deficit but is only perceived by its citizens as democratically illegitimate because
it lacks credibility (1999). R ecently, Andrew Moravcsik has attacked the democratic deficit
thesis from a different starting point than M aj one. I believe Maj one's and M o ravcsik's
responses taken together constitute the most persuasive argument against the democratic
deficit thesis.
Majone views the EU as primarily a 'regulatory state' (1996). A 'regulatory state'
attempts to address m arket failure and does so by creating policies which produ ce outcomes
that are Pareto efficient. Tlus contrasts with natio nal governments in the m embers states
w hich also deal wi th policies that are distributive or redistributive in outcome. M,uone
believes that the m ember states have intentionally delegated their regulatory power to the
Europea n level by creating the EU (1993). Some examples of this delegation can be seen in
the creation of the common market, the making of monetary policy by the ECB, and the
standardization of health and safet y rules. Majone believes that these regulatory policies we re
intentio nally isolated from domestic majoritarian government b ecause the best policy
o utcom es are achieved o n these issues when policy making is isolated tro m popular pressure
(1994). Through his perception of the EU as a 'regulatory state' M ajone weakens the 'strong
national executive' argument of the dem ocratic deficit thesis.
With this view of the EU · in mind Maj o ne can also dismiss the 'distance' and
'accountability' arguments of the democrati c deficit thesis. If EU p olicy making was made
m ore accountable to citizens or decreased its complexity then policy o utcomes would cease
to be Pareto efficient. This is the case because allowing m o re participation and
accountability would allow the political m ajority to select policy outcomes that may run
counter to the political minority or the long term interests of the majority (Majone, 1994) .
So in M ajone's view the 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments are actually assets for the
EU since the EU is able to generate outcomes which national majoritarian parliaments
canno t achieve subj ect to greater participation and accountability from citizens.
Taking this line of reasoning one step further Majone dispatches the 'weak European
Parliament' argument by claiming that an EU dominated by the European Parliament or a
directl y elected ConUlussion would end up politicizing regulato ry policy-making (1998).
Politicization would lead to policy o utcomes which were redistributive and not just Pareto
efficient (1998). If policy-making at the EU became politicized the EU would become even
more illegitimate since its main reaso n for existing, to isolate regulatory decisions from
public pressure to achieve Pareto efficient policy o utcomes, would cease to exist. So the
weakness of the European Parliament decried by the 'weak European Parliament' argument
also turns o ut to be an asset for the EU if we believe that the EU is predominately a
'regulatory state'.
While Majone's reasoning does appear to defeat the democratic deficit thesis it is
dependent on the normative and empirical claim that the EU is predonunately a 'regulatory
state' . If we believe that the EU does and should playa role in crea ting policies that lead to
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redistributive policy o utcomes then M aj o ne's argument weakens considerably. Yet, it is also
worth noting that Maj o ne, even in the absence of a democratic deficit, supports refo rrns to
make the EU more credible with the public like increases in policy m aking transparency
and improving the quality ofEU legislatio n (2005). H owever, it is still difl:lcult to igno re the
fact that M ajone's attack on the dem ocratic defici t thesis relies o n a rather constrained
perception of the E uropean Union's purpose and legitimate policy portfolio. W e will next
examine Moravcsik 's argument against the democratic deficit thesis which does not
n ecessaril y need the ' regulato ry state' fo undation.
Mo ra vcsik 's critiqu e of the dem ocratic defi cit thesis is the m ost extensive critique
existing ill the literature and touches o n all five of the democratic deficit arguments. In a
series of papers M oravcsik (2002b, 2004, 2005b, 2006a , & 2006b) seem s to provide
satisfactory answers to m ost of the dem ocratic deficit arguments.
In response to the 'distance' argument, Moravcsik argues that the E U policy m akin g
process is far more transparent than the policy making process in the domestic governments
of m ember states (2004, 17-18). According the M o ravcsik, the EU has gone out of its way
to m ake it easier for citizens to access documents or informatio n rela ted to EU policy
making so they are not so confused as to be unable to fo nn preferences on EU policy (2004,
18). H e argues it is now mu ch easier to get informatio n o n the policy making process at the
EU level compared to the dom estic leveL H e also claims a number of safeguards exist to
scrutinize the poli cy making process, even if it is technocratic, like the European Court of
Justice, the European Parliament, national parliaments, and natio nal courts (2004, 19-20).
Moravcsik thinks the sum of the aforementioned reasons makes a strong case for the EU to
be viewed as an institution which is transparent and close to the citizens.
When Moravcsik turns his attention to the 'drift' argument, raised by so cial democrat
sch olars, he finds no evidence that the EU lacks dem ocratic legitimacy because " its policies
are biased against particular interests that are consensually recognized as legitimate" (2004 ,
21). M oravcsik claims that there is little to no evidence that regulato ry protection or social
policies in Europe are b eing eroded as a result of an alleged neo-liberal bias in the E uropean
Unio n's policy nu king (2004,22). Furthermore, M oravcsik points to the empirical claim
that the level of social welfare provisio n in Europe has remained relatively stable throughout
the process of European integratio n (2004,22). H e also sees the 'drift' argument as null since
the £actors that drive increases in social spending are dom estically specific and not occurring
at the EU level in a uniform manner (2004, 23). H e finally concludes that the European
Union's policies adequately reflect " patterns of consensus and contestation" within the
bodies of citizens in the EU member states (2004,24).
Aside from examining the outcomes of EU policy to attack the 'drift' argument
Moravcsik also points to the institutio nalized process constraints in the EU that prevent
drift. The elaborate ch ecks and balances built into the structure of the EU ensure that an
overwhelming consensus is required for any policy to be passed (2005b, 4 & 2002b, 6). Take
for example, the requirement of unanimity for reform of treatises followed by either
majority in the Conunission plus a qualified majority in the European Parliam ent or
unanimity in the CounciL Add on top of those checks judicial review by the European
Court ofJustice and national courts and it begins to look very difl:lcult for passed legislation
to drift away from the majority viewpoints. So Moravcsik doesn't believe that any single
group of private interests can dominate the policy m aking process (2004,19). This is also the
case because minority viewpoints are consciously solicited by the Commission w hich
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actively seeks to listen to groups with diffuse interests. Groups with difiuse interests also have
access to policy makers in the Council and the European Parliament.
The 'strong national executives' argument is also dispatched by Moravcsik through an
argument that national executives are still the most directly accountable politicians in the
member states (2002b, 8). He argues that the "democratically elected governments of the
Member States, which dominate the still largely territorial and intergovernmental structure
of EU" are an important channel for creating democratic accountability at the EU level
(2002b, 8). Basically, he is arguing that the EU does strengthen the national executives that
play dominant roles in EU institutions, but the 'executive argument' of the democratic
deficit thesis is not problematic because these national executives are still democratically
controlled by their domestic voters and parliaments.
In response to the 'weak European Parliament' , Moravcsik agrees that this was a
problem in the past but claims it no longer is. The EU, according to Moravcsik, has already
properly addressed potential imbalances of power among its institutions by significantly
increasing the powers of the European Parliament (2005b, 5). For example, the EP now
oflicially has veto- power over the selection of the Commission and is exercising tlus power
more frequently. Reforming the co-decision procedure in the Amsterdam Treaty now means
that legislation cannot be passed under co-decision unless a majority is found in the Council
and the Parliament. However, Moravcsik doesn't appear to fully defeat the 'parliament
argument' since the consultation procedure can still be used to pass legislation, efIectively
bypassing the co-decision procedure which would involve the Parliament.
In response to the lack of EU elections, what we referred to earlier as the
'accountability' argument, Moravcsik advances his strongest case against the democratic
deficit thesis. Moravcsik rejects the prenuse that more opportl1luties for direct participation
in public deliberation · will autoinatically lead to increased popular support for EU
institutions (2005b, 5 & 2006, 222). He doesn't believe that more opportl1luties to
participate will cause citizens to participate more (2006, 223). He also doesn't think such
participation will bring ahout more informed deliberation about the direction of the EU
policy agenda hy the voters (2006, 228). Finally, he doesn't think that more informed
deliberation on the part of citizens necessarily improves the political legitimacy of the EU
or the trust that citizens have in the EU as an institution (2006, 233).To prove this final point
Moravcsik looks at polling data about institutional trust to argue that publics in advanced
democracies generally like and trust insulated institutions like arnues, police forces,
constitutional courts, and independent central banks more than legislatures (2006, 32 &
2004,24-25). Once again it is shown that the 'accountability' argul11.ent may actually be an
asset since its operation in the EU insulates policy portfolios that citizens feel are best
insulated from popular pressure.
Moravcsik also mounts a second strand of attack on the 'accountability' argument by
clainung that EU legislative policy portfolios are concentrated in issues of low salience to
European voters (2004,25). Therefore, any efiorts to expand the forums for participation,
like more EU offices selected by elections, is unlikely to overcome apathy (2004, 25).
Moravcsik lists the five most salient issues, according to polls, in most EU members as health
care provision, education, law and order, pension and social security policy, and taxation
(2005b, 5). According to Moravcsik, none of these issues is a competency for the EU (2005b,
6). He concludes that it is possible that voters just choose to remain rationally ignorant about
the EU agenda because the issues it touches are not important to them (2006a, 230). For
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this same reason Moravcsik argues that European Parliament elections do not work and will
not be contests about the EU agenda anytime soon (2002b, 11). European Parliament
elections become about domestic politics because only domestic issues are salient enough
to mobilize popular support during an election. So ultimately, more political contestation
through elections will not make the EU more democratic, according to Moravcsik, because
"lack of salience, not lack of opportunity, may be the critical constraint on European
political pal-ticipation (2004,24)".
POINTS OF CONTENTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT DEBATE

By the process oflaying out the fullest respo nse to the democratic deficit thesis in the
previo us section we have already covered most of the main points of contention. However,
three major points of contention still seem to separate the two sides of this debate. First, we
must question Majon e's main contention that the EU is a 'regulatory state' (1999). Majone 's
theoretical assumption that purely Pareto efi"icient policies with no redistributive effects may
on normative grounds be isolated ti-om democratic accountability is correct. However, as
Hix and Follesdal point out, the problem comes at the empirical level since the "empirical
reality of decisions is a continuum between policies that are predominately efficient and
policies that are predominately redistributive, with many mixes (2006,542)". On one side
of the continuum we have judicial decision and technical decisions about products which
are at the efficient extrem e. On the redistributive extreme we have EU expenditure policies.
In between these two extremes the bulk of EU policy making occurs, like the construction
and regulation of the market, competition policies, and interest rate policies. Furthermore,
Hix and Follesdal emphasize, that at the individual level the winners and losers from
redistributive polices are nl.Uch more apparent (2006,543). For example, farmers, depressed
regions, and researchers are net winners because they receive large amounts of the EU
budget as a percentage of their income. Taxpayers at the individual level who pay into the
EU budget receive widely varying amounts of net- benefit or net- loss from EU expenditures
policies. Majone may wish that all EU regulation was only purely Pareto efficient.Yet, m any
EU regulatory policies have identifiable winners and losers Gorges, 1999)_ So M ,~o ne
appears to not be able to give a compelling reason why policies which are redistributive
should b e isolated from democratic contestation so he can not diminish the demands of the
democratic deficit thesis for more responsive and accountable EU officials.
The next two m ajor points of contention are raised by Moravcsik (2006). The first
point of contention is detailed by Follesdal and Hix when they claim the "match between
preferen ces and policies should no t only occur as a matter of fact, but there should be
mechanisms that reliably ensure that this power will indeed be so used (2006, 545)".
Moravcsik uses empirical evidence to respond to the 'drift' and 'accountability' argument to
show that present policy outcomes created by EU institutions are acce ptable to citizens.
Based on tllls empirical evidence we can grant Moravcsik success in defeating the 'drift'
argument that policy outcomes drift away from the preferences of the majority of voters in
the EU. However, defense of institutions as democrati cally accountable must also show,
according to Hix and Follesdal, that the institutions "can reliably be expected to secure more
acceptable outcomes in the future than the alternatives considered" (2006, 545). For
example, the institutions must be sufficiently responsive to the best interests of the voters.
Moravcsik with his empirical evidence focusing on the acceptability of policy outcomes
does not offer a response to the argument that the poli cy making process is unaccountable
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to voters preferences, and therefore, cannot defeat the 'accountability' argument. However,
Moravcsik can still argue that procedural constraints like oversized majorities and indirect
control of EU officials by national parliaments may make it more likely that policy
outcomes acceptable to the majority of citizens will still be reached. Essentially, this second
point of contention shows that it is still highly contested whether or not the 'accountability'
argument can be dismissed with only empirical evidence of outcome acceptability without
showing that the policy creation m echanism will tend to secure the most acceptable
outcomes to a majority of voters .
The final remaining major point of contention centers on how voter preferences are
determined. Follesdal and Hix argue that the key difference between democratic and nondemocratic institutions "is that citizens form their views about which policy option they
prefer through a process of deliberation and party contestation that are essential elements of
all democracies (2006, 545)". So if we follow Moravcsik's and Majone's concept of isolating
certain arenas of policy making from public participation or deliberation we don't allow
preferences to properly form among voters. This may explain why EU citizens see issues that
the EU addresses as possessing low salience. The 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments
prevent EU citizens from deliberating and participating in the policy making process so
their preferences come out unformed or malformed. Basically, there is a serious
disagreement in the democratic deficit debate about whether preferences and the salience
of policy issues are formed endogenously to the policy making process or are fixed
exogenously. This leads to a contentious disagreement between the two sides of the debate
over whether the 'distance' and 'accountability' arguments are actually problematic for the
EO.
Given the three major poin~s of contention outlined above, the democratic deficit
debate essentially appears to distill down to the democratic deficit thesis proponents arguing
for a change in the EU to bring about a constrained form of democratic rule with more
popular participation and deliberation. In contrast their opponents, like Majone and
Moravcsik, support some weak form of technocratic rule with far less participation needed
from the public.
PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

Out of this rich debate on the democratic deficit thesis many proposals for
constitutional reform to fix aspects of the EU that appear democratically illegitimate have
been suggested. This final section presents four sets of proposals although dozens more have
arisen from the democratic deficit debate.
First, there has arisen out of the democratic deficit debate a group of proposals to
address the 'accountability' and 'distance' arguments of the democratic deficit thesis. This
group of proposals attempts to provide the EU with issues to tackle which are more salient
with voters. For example, Phillippe Schmitter advocates making the EU more redistributive
by giving it more power in pensions and social security, giving it the power to be more
supportive of immigrants and aliens, and allowing it to rebalance national welfare systems
away from the elderly (2000) . Citizens would then be forced to reorient their attention in
the direction of the EU agenda because the policy outcomes of the EU would be making
them winners or losers. This would lead citizens to demand more elections of EU officials
and actually nuke such elections about the direction of EU policy instead of second order
national contests. According to Schmitter, expanding the powers of EU would in effect
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increase deliberation, improve preference formation, and increase participation by voters in
the EU since the EU would be dealing with high salience issues (2000).
Moravcsik believes that following Schmitter's suggestion of making the EU more
redistributive, and therefore, more sali ent in an attempt to increase deliberation,
participation , and preference formation is a terrible idea (Moravcsik, 2004 , 26). Moravcsik
believes Schmitter presents a coherent scheme of reform directed at those that are most
dissatisfied with the EU, namely the poor, less well educated, female, and public sector
employees (2004, 26). However, su ch a program of reform would not work because it would
result in "a higher level of political conflict, domestic and interstate, than Europe has seen
in several generations and perhaps the collapse of the organization" as the losers end their
willingness to participate in the process of European integration as a result of the reform.s
(2004, 26).
However, fixing the 'accountability' and 'distance' arguments by increasing
participation brought on by increasing the number of high salience issues the EU addresses
is not a program of reform without merit. For example, during German y's EU presidency
Chancellor Merkel has shown a willingness to mobilize public concern over climate change
to try and re- launch the draft constitutional treaty (Williamson & Parker, 2007). Germany
decided not to cut down the treaty but improve it. The topic of climate protection has been
chosen as an obvious candidate for addition to the treaty because it is an issue of high voter
salience (Williamson & Parker, 2007). These actions by Germany can b e seen as an attempt
to demonstrate the relevance of the European Union's policy making to the voters in hopes
that they will participate in passing a revised draft constitutional treaty. So taking certain
issues of high salience with voters and giving the EU the power to legislate on them may
actually increase political participation by voters and partially fix the 'accountability' and
'distance' arguments.
The second group of proposals for constitutional reform is found in the draft
copstitution. As stated earlier, the European constitutional project was in part undertaken as
a way to respond.to the arguments made against the legitimacy of the EU in the democratic
deficit thesis. There are a number of items contained in the draft constitution that attempt
to address the democratic deficit thesis. For exam.ple, it extends the power of co-decision to
almost all policy areas. This addresses the 'strong national executives' and 'weak European
Parliament' arguments since the powers of the European Parliament dramatically improves
as it becomes a truly equal partner in legislation with the Council during all policy making
at the EU level. The draft treaty also requires the Council to meet in public when legislating,
and therefore, addresses the 'distance argument' by nuking policy making less opaque and
foreign to citizens. The draft treaty further address the 'weak European Parliament' argument
by mandating that national parliaments receive info about new EU policy proposals with
enough time to mandate ministers on how to vote in the Council. Perhaps, the most
groundbreaking clause of the draft treaty is it gives national parliaments the ability to send
back legislation to the Conmussion which the national parliaments believe is outside the
scope of the European Union's policy portfolio as defined by previous treaties. This goes a
long way towards remedying the 'strong national executives ' and 'weak European
Parliament' arguments. Finally, the draft contains a clause which requires the Conmlission to
consider any proposal for legislation which has the support of 1 nullion EU citizens . This
reform starts to dispatch the 'drift' and 'distance' arguments. However, with the Dutch and
French 'no ' votes to the draft constitution there has been a debate about whether the
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constitutional draft was too bold in its reforms or not revolutio nary enough. The German
govermnent, the current h olders of the EU presiden cy in the Council, has made it known
that it will not remove clauses from the draft constitution but attempt to add bolder reforms
as it attempts to re-Iaunch the draft constitution (Williamson & Parker, 2007).
The final two sets of proposals for constitutio nal reform are diametrically opposed
when it comes to the future direction of reform to the EU. The third set of proposals sees
the failure of the draft constitution as a sign that the current constitutional arrangem ents are
sufficient and the EU is for the m ost part already democrati cally legitimate. The fourth set
of proposals supports the current EU presidency's positio n by arguing that bolder reforrns
are needed for the constitutio n b eyond those contained in the draft constitution if the
dem ocratic deficit is going to be remedied.
The third set of proposals favo r drastically cutting down the dratt constitution if it is
going to be relaunch ed or allowing the draft to die. M oravcsik has been a strong advocate
of maintaining the current constitutional status guo (2006, 238). Keep in nl.ind that he
argues that even if elem ents of the democratic deficit exist they are not problematic. He
argues that holding the EU up to a standard of direct majoritarian democracy is
counterproductive and im practical (2006, 238). This is the case because no m odern
democracy meets this standard and no modern democracy aspires to do so. According to this
viewpoint, m any elements of the EU that are attacked in the democratic deficit thesis are
ac tuall y assets to the E U give n the low salience of the issues the EU legislates on and the
intentio nal isolation of certain portfolios in the EU from politicization. According to
M oravcsik, those supporting a final constitutional settlem ent for Europe or the draft
constitution, erroneously believe that public participation and deliberation are ends in
themselves and are the sole source' ofl egitim3cy (2006,238). H e argues that the view that
the E U suffers from a democratic deficit compared to its member states comes from the fact
that the EU deals with issues that are also commonly delegated and insulated in the member
states' dom~stic political scenes (2006,239). Those advocating the third set of proposals for
constitutional reform essentially defend the status guo. T hey see the failure of the draft
constitution as a demonstratio n of Europe's success and stability. To sununarize, according to
M oravcsik, they see in the failure of draft constitution " the stability of both the substantive
and institutional dimensions of the current constitutional settlement" (2006, 236).
The fourth and final set of proposals attempt more drama tic reform of the
constitution in an effort to increase political contestation in all the institutions of the EU.
For example, proponents of this path, like Follesdal and Hix, advocate more political
contestation as essential for preference formation among voters and for the exercise of
accountability over officials at the EU level by voters in the EU (2006, 548-50). To bring
abo ut an increase in political contestation they propose increasing the power of the
Europea n Parliament to allow the political parties that are fo rming in the Parliament to
politicize the policy making process further. They also propose more transparency in the
Council in the fo rm of allowing the m edia to report who proposed which policies, who
proposed amendments, and w ho was on each side when the final vote was taken . This
increased transparency wo uld allow the public to hold governments responsible fo r their
vo tes in the Council.
Advocates of the fourth set of proposals, like Hix and Follesdal, argue that the
Conmu ssion's role in setting the policy agenda needs to be open to contestatio n and
criticism (2006,554). Furthermore, this viewpoint advances that an institutional mechanism
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needs to be found fo r generating m o re debate and contestation about politics in the EU,
not just debate abo ut the EU as an institution. Hix and Follesdal propose opening up the
presidency of the conUllissio n to political contestatio n as the simplest m ethod of achieving
tlus desired institutio nal mechanism . Hix proposes a direct electio n of the C ommission
preside nt by the citizens o r the national parliaments (2002) . A less ambitio us route would be
to m ake the natio nal executives in the Council all ow a more open battle for president of
the conunission with o ut further constitutional refo rm . It is thou ght by proponents of the
fourth set of proposals that increased political contestation fo r the President of the
ConU11issio n would create m ore debate abo ut the best policy agenda to r the EU am o ng the
citizens and offi cials in the EO. This refo rm, according to advocates of m o re radicJI refo rms
than those proposed in the drJft constitution, wo uld take an enorm ous step towa rds
destroying the dem ocratic deficit in the EO. H owever, bolder refo rm of the E uropean
Unio n 's constitutio n m akes sense if and o nl y if we really believe that the elem ents of the
E U w hich are described as undem ocratic are actually problematic.
CONCLUSION

I am most persuaded by the set o f proposals whi ch attempt m ore dramatic reform of
the constitution in an effo rt to increase political contestation. Wlule I think there are stro ng
countera rguments against the ' weak E uropean Parliament Argument' and the 'strong
n atio nal executive ' elem ents of the dem ocratic deficit, the 'distance ' and 'accountability'
arguments have, in m y opiluon, no t been adequately countered . For this reason I tend to
favo r the proposals fo r constitutional reforms that present m echanism s for increasing
political contestatio n. I think only lllo re contestatio n in the European Union 's policy
niaking and leadership contests will m ake the public truly begin to deliberate, participate,
and h old EU policy makers accountable. I don 't agree with MorJvcsik when he claims that
preferen ces can be fo rmed exogeno us to the policy m aking process. In my mind issues w ill
only becom e more salient to vo ters if they form preferences on the issues and preferences
can o nly be formed thro ugh participatio n . There are m echanisms which will encourage the
formatio n of preference and make E U policy portfolios more salient. T hese m echalusms
should be implem ented . It is my o piluo n that witho ut the benefits wluch flow from further
political contestatio n the E U will m aintain the status quo of technocratic rule and continue
to have a severe dem ocratic deficit .
The contribu tio ns of the scholars discussed in this paper to form alizing and enriching
the debate about the dem ocratic defi cit thesis have certainly led to m any new proposals fo r
refo rnung the constitutio n of the E uropean Unio n . We started by defining the dem ocratic
defi cit thesis and then exanuned som e respo nses to the thesis. N ext, we tried to fl esh o ut
the m aj o r remailung points of contentio n that exist in the democratic deficit debate: Finally,
we exanuned four sets of proposals fo r further co nstitutio nal reform that have com e out of
the dem ocratic deficit debate. A consensus on the future of constitutional reform in the E U
or the existence of the democratic defi cit has not been reached and probably will n ever be
achieved. However, it is clear that the direction of future constitutional reforms in the EU
will b e heavily influe nced by develo pments in the debate surrounding the existence of a
dem ocratic deficit in the E O.
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